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This article charts the broad shifts in Vanuatu’s
policy environment caused by progressive political
fragmentation over the past 24 years. Recent
electoral returns show an upsurge in support for
independents and minor parties with strong local
credibility, suggesting a move away from the ‘big-
picture’ politics of the 1970s and 1980s, and a shift
away from the major parties.
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Previously known as the New Hebrides, until
1980 the Republic of Vanuatu was
administered jointly by France and Britain
under the Anglo-French Condominium
created in 1914. The system created bifurcated
colonial structures, including policing, legal
and administrative systems (MacClancy
1980, 1981, van Trease 1995). Conducted
largely by the Christian missions, education
also created linguistic divisions within and
between ni-Vanuatu communities, with
Marists undertaking most of their education
in French, while the protestant religions used
English as the language of education (Miles
1998). Given the strong colonial rivalries
between the United Kingdom and France, the
social cleavages created by colonialism were
often replicated in the Melanesian societies
in the New Hebrides (Miles 1994). These
tendencies inflected the emergent political
culture of the archipelago, as politically active
ni-Vanuatu gravitated towards either the
Anglophone or Francophone-dominated
parties (Miles 1994, Molisa, Vurobaravu and
van Trease 1982).1
Party polarisation, 1971–88
From the beginning of the 1970s until the
late 1980s, Vanuatu’s political landscape
was characterised by the above-mentioned
polarities. Originally named the New
Hebrides National Party (NHNP), the
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN VANUATU
41
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 19 Number 3 2004 © Asia Pacific Press
Vanua’aku Pati was formed in Santo in 1971
by members of the Anglican and Presbyterian
clergy, junior British Administration
bureaucrats and teachers (Plant 1977). In
1977, in line with its nationalist agenda, the
NHNP under the leadership of Anglican
cleric, Father Walter Lini, was renamed the
Vanua’aku Pati (Our Land Party). From the
mid 1970s onwards, the party pressed for
the rapid decolonisation of the New
Hebrides through a concerted program of
demonstrations and political agitation (Plant
1977, MacClancy 1981). Like nationalist
parties elsewhere in the decolonising world,
the Vanua’aku Pati was determined to
maintain the territorial integrity of the New
Hebrides, post-colony, despite the emergence
of federalist movements in the southern and
northern islands, fomented by foreign agents
(Beasant 1984, Bonnemaison 1986). When
the Vanua’aku Pati won the 1979 national
elections, fought over the issue of
independence and who would lead the New
Hebrides afterwards, these groups attempted
open secession. With support from the British
colonial administration, Papua New Guinea,
Australia and New Zealand, the Lini
administration suppressed the rebellions.
Because many French colons supported the
revolts and because the French metropolitan
government and colonial administration
were seen to be complicit in their planning
(Beasant 1984, Leder 1981), the Vanua’aku
Pati adopted an anti-French stance in the
early 1980s, culminating in the expulsion of
the French ambassador in 1981.
Integral to the Vanua’aku Pati’s original
platform was the return of alienated land,
the development of Vanuatu and respect for
kastom as the basis of national cohesion.
Initially, this was conceived under the rubric
of ‘Melanesian socialism’ (Premdas 1987),
but it dovetailed with the emerging discourse
on the Melanesian Way, articulated most
clearly by the Papua New Guinea lawyer
Bernard Narokobi (Otto 1997). Vanua’aku
Pati foreign policy was based on its
membership of the Non-Aligned Movement
and involved advocacy for the decolonisation
of the remaining Melanesian colonies (West
Papua and New Caledonia) and a rejection
of cold war alliances. In practice, this policy
allowed it to play off one foreign power
against another in an attempt to leverage
better funding. In the decade after
independence, Vanuatu offered fishing rights
to the Soviet Union and brokered trade or
training relations with Cuba and Libya
(Albinski 1995), threatening ANZUS policy
imperatives in the Southwest Pacific. After
the ending of the cold war, Vanua’aku Pati
gravitated towards political centrism.
The UMP began its existence at
independence as an amalgam of groups
opposed to the majority Vanua’aku Pati.
Principal among its constituent groups were
the urban Union Communautes des Nouvelles
Hebrides (UCNH) and the Mouvement
Autonomiste des Nouvelles-Hebrides (MANH),
both formed in 1973. The party also attracted
support from the Tan Union on Pentecost,
Namangki Aute from Malakula, former
Nagriamel supporters in Santo, Pentecost,
Ambae and Maewo, and from Jon Frum and
other social movements in Tanna and the
southern islands. The groups renamed
themselves the UMP in 1981, arguably to
distance themselves from the stigma attached
to the rebellion (Boulekone 1995).
What unified the UMP was their
opposition to the Vanua’aku Pati’s rigid
centralism. Indeed, despite accepting some
level of decentralisation into their platform
in the late 1970s (Ghai 1988), the Vanua’aku
Pati was opposed to incorporating it fully
on the grounds that it would legitimise the
agendas of their federalist and secessionist
political opponents. The Union of Moderate
Parties (UMP), by comparison, favoured
greater regional autonomy; a policy borne out
of its fragmented origins. For the first decade
after independence, therefore, Vanuatu’s
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political blocs could be delineated into
federalist and centralist camps, in addition
to the basic Francophone/Anglophone
divide.
Political fragmentation, 1988–97
Beginning in 1988, however, the political
stability that characterised Vanuatu politics
began to erode, as leadership challenges
within the Vanua’aku Pati provoked two
major factional splits. In 1988, a faction allied
to Barak Sope, the Vanua’aku Pati
parliamentary whip, defected after
disagreements over land policy sparked
rioting in Port Vila. In 1991, the founder of the
party, Father Walter Lini, defected when senior
Vanua’aku Pati members attempted to wrest
him of the leadership after he suffered a stroke.
The defections split the anglophone vote and
consequently the Vanua’aku Pati lost office
in 1991. Thereafter, coalitions became
necessary vehicles for the formation of
government, but they have often proved
precarious, being plagued by fierce infighting
and competition over ministerial posts.
Fragile coalition governments are often
forced to ‘horse trade’ to maintain their hold
on power and opposition parties readily
accept ministerial posts, parliamentary
committee positions or parliamentary offices
(such as Speaker) as inducements. Coalition
member parties engage in frenetic efforts to
progress upwardly within governments,
mostly with the intention of claiming the
prized post of Prime Minister or one of the
other preferred portfolios. Largely, opposition
members are denied access to government
resources, leading to their often frantic
attempts to rejoin the government ranks. These
tendencies necessarily propel political
centrifugalism within the parliamentary
parties and, therefore, within the national
parliament. A situation has arisen in which
both opposition and government coalitions
are intrinsically frail. Failure to provide
desirable positions to coalition members can
result in loss of government. Even the slightest
shift in power in parliament can initiate a
complete reorganisation of ruling coalitions,
such as occurred between 1995 and 1997
(Morgan 1998).
The major casualties of national political
manoeuvring during the 1990s were
parliamentary oversight, law making, and
durable policy formation and imple-
mentation—especially with relation to
macroeconomic policy (Asian Development
Bank 1998, 2003). In periods of intense political
instability, policy formulation, even at its most
fundamental level, was subordinated to
horsetrading. For example, between his
inauguration as Minister of Finance in
February 1996 and his eventual dismissal from
Cabinet in mid 1997, Barak Sope failed to
provide a development budget or an annual
budget (Vanuatu Weekly, 10 August 1996:2).
More recently, it has become apparent that the
regular incapacitation of parliamentary
sessions in the 1990s contributed to the
dominance of the legislature by an
unaccountable executive (Morgan 2001). With
public scrutiny diverted by a succession of
political dramas, several short-lived
governments stripped state coffers and sold
off state assets, often to themselves as private
citizens (Vanuatu, Ombudsman 1995).
During the mid 1990s, corruption became a
primary means of advancement for
government members of parliament,
particularly those who sought to augment
their own wealth with resources
misappropriated from the state.
The reform agenda, 1997–2004
In early 1997, Vanuatu was virtually
bankrupted and Serge Vohor, then UMP
Prime Minister, began the implementation of
the Comprehensive Reform Programme
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(CRP), supported by the Asian Development
Bank and foreign aid donors. According to
its authors, the CRP was the blueprint by
which the ‘poor performance of the
institutions of government’ would be
rectified through the strengthening of the
Office of the Ombudsman and the enactment
of a Leadership Code (Vanuatu 1997).
The implementation of the CRP quickly
became a cleavage around which the parties
mobilised for electoral support. Fuelled by
reports of the negative impact of structural
adjustment programs in Papua New Guinea
and the widespread pessimism about
Westminster democracy in Vanuatu, the belief
that the CRP might endanger the sovereignty
of ni-Vanuatu people became an enduring
theme in political rhetoric. Barak Sope, the
leader of the Melanesian Progressive Party,
has stated that the CRP would cause
suffering to the people of Vanuatu and
‘serves the interests of Australia and New
Zealand’, although in office he has been
forced to grant the project tacit support
(Trading Post 19 May 2001, 17 September
1997).
Despite being grounded in sound
economic principles, many reforms
undertaken under the auspices of the CRP
have proved extremely unpopular among ni-
Vanuatu. On taking office in 1998, the
Kalpokas government (Vanua’aku Pati/
National United Party) inherited a deficit
estimated to be four billion vatu (US$34
million), forcing it to accept a US$22 million
tied loan from the Asian Development Bank,
earmarked for the reduction of the
bureaucracy and the implementation of
guidelines for public servants. However,
domestically, Kalpokas was criticised for the
slow pace of reform and the lack of visible
indicators of economic growth. Rural
constituents voiced concern over the
introduction of the value-added tax, which
they felt benefited urban dwellers and
Chinese (sinois) merchants more than them.
In November 1999, with dwindling
parliamentary support, the Kalpokas
government resigned from office rather than
face a motion of no-confidence.
It was replaced by the coalition
government of Barak Sope. Between his
accession in 1999 and his ouster in April
2001, Sope undertook several perilous
financial deals in the hope of pulling
Vanuatu quickly from the brink of financial
disaster, rather than the lengthier and
politically unpopular process of institutional
reform. The most prominent involved
Amerendra Nath Ghosh, who arrived in Port
Vila in February 2000 with what was
described as ‘possibly the world’s largest
ruby’, which he intended to ‘donate’ to the
people of Vanuatu. Ghosh promised to
initiate a project to seal the road around Efate,
build a walled complex for the Council of
Ministers, and negotiate with foreign
consortia to build a new international airport
(Nasara, 14 April 2001). In return for the ruby,
it was reported that Ghosh was to receive
US$300 million in bearer bonds from the
Reserve Bank, equal to 140 per cent of
Vanuatu’s gross domestic product. Had Sope
issued the bonds, Vanuatu’s total debt would
have quadrupled (Australian Financial Review,
26 February 2001). Sope lost power in the
2001. However, Barak Sope follows the
original and still popular platform of the
Vanua’aku Pati closely, advocating for the
decolonisation of West Papua and
championing an autonomist foreign policy.
Trading on these issues and through his
astute reading of constituency politics, Sope
has positioned himself as one of Vanuatu’s
great political survivors. He has won a seat
in every election he has contested.
Edward Natapei, the leader of the
Vanua’aku Pati, then came to power as
leader of a Vanua’aku Pati/UMP
government coalition, committed to following
through with its reform agenda. The
continued survival of the Vanua’aku Pati/
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UMP government coalition brought respite
from the entrenched political instability of
the 1990s, but key obstacles remained,
principally poor public opinion of the CRP.
By maintaining an emphasis on financial
accountability and responsible leadership,
Natapei signalled his intention to stamp out
the form of maverick politics that Sope
embodied, especially his record of economic
mismanagement and possible corruption.
Simultaneously, community pressure on
members of parliament to distance
themselves from the CRP was evident. In
light of attacks from within the Vanua’aku
Pati membership on the CRP, party leaders
have proposed a much shorter list of
achievable reform priorities and posited a
much greater emphasis on grassroots people
(Trading Post, 25 August 2001). Yet they
remained committed to the basic precepts of
the CRP, incorporating economic growth and
public administration reform into the party
platform in 2002 (Trading Post, 25 April
2002:3).
The 2002 elections were fought explicitly
over the continuance of the Asian
Development Bank-sponsored Compre-
hensive Reform Program (Port Vila Presse, 20
April 2002:1). The National United Party and
the Melanesian Progressive Party
campaigned against the CRP, stating that it
was neo-colonial and designed to benefit
western powers to the detriment of grassroots
ni-Vanuatu. The Vanua’aku Pati regained
power but throughout the term the
government was criticised for its poor record
of local development. Projects were seen to
stagnate as the government prioritised
stability and financial accountability,
resulting in pressure for more rural
development projects being exerted on
government members of parliament. Parallel
with the increasing emphasis on reform was
growing disenchantment within the
Vanua’aku Pati about its direction and
policies. The aspirations of a generation of
younger members of parliament created
splits within the party. Tension culminated
in the early months of 2004, when three
senior members of parliament, including
former Prime Minister Donald Kalpokas,
formed a dissident faction. Their split
triggered the dissolution of parliament.
The 2004 elections resulted in one of
Vanuatu’s most fragmented parliaments.
The elections were called to end political
instability, but the major parties suffered
severe losses. Several senior parliament-
arians—including several ministers and the
former Prime Minister, Donald Kalpokas—
were voted out of office. In all, 23 sitting
members lost their seats. Despite the
recognition of the dangers of political
instability by the major parties, the 2004
elections demonstrated the progressive
‘balkanisation’ of national parliaments and
the possible death of big-issue politics, as
voters appeared to favour locally credible
social movements, minor parties and
independents.
Political manoeuvring and the
concomitant deterioration in service
provision and policy formulation has
disenchanted many ni-Vanuatu about
Westminster style democracy. Key local
leaders have argued that democratic
government is leading Melanesian people
inexorably to calamity. The apparent creation
of divisions through politics suggests to
many ni-Vanuatu the societal violence
experienced in Solomon Islands or Papua
New Guinea (Morgan 2004). A former
member of the national parliament in
Vanuatu and now a regional non-
government organisation director, Hilda
Lini, attempted to capitalise on this belief
when she called for the endorsement of a new,
more indigenous form of governance in
Vanuatu
[t]his outdated western system of
democracy will continue to corrupt
Melanesia, resulting in the continuous
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uncontrolled crime, violence and
poverty [and] ongoing crisis (Port Vila
Presse, 27 October 2001).
Members of parliament are increasingly
expected to provide access to resources and
‘development’ funds. Indeed, all members of
parliament act as central nodes in networks
of distribution and exchange focused on
access to state resources. In turn, this
generates incredible pressure for members of
parliament to provide for their constituents
(albeit mainly at election time). As a result,
members of parliament are forced into frantic
efforts to join government and gain access to
the state’s funds. This political economy has
diverted the attention of members of
parliament from their institutional roles as
law makers, overseers of government, and
representatives.
Local strategies to combat political
instability are based on non-partisan local
representation and are increasingly visible.
The formation of Nevsem Nenparata, which
won a seat in the 2004 elections, offers a case
in point. The party prioritises local
development and national unity and
represents a local coalition between several
of the federalist parties mentioned above. In
Erromangan language, nevsem nenparata
means ‘to come together in peace’ (Port Presse
Online, 28 May 2004). The party incorporates
local supporters of several political parties
including the UMP and Melanesian
Progressive Party who have pooled their
electoral resources. Much of the impetus to
form the party came from local chiefs who
sought to end political infighting on
Erromango and who were dissatisfied with
the existing party system and the lack of
interaction between members of parliament
and their constituencies. In particular, the
impetus for forming the alliance came from
the fear that the government would
potentially squander Erromomango’s
natural resources, including sandalwood, if
there were no Erromangans in parliament to
protect them. At the movement’s foundation,
its organiser, Chief Mike Yori, stated
…before Independence, the chiefs held
power and everything worked
correctly. Immediately after
Independence it was the Vanua’aku
Pati which rules. Then the government
split and everything deteriorated.
Unity doesn’t any longer seem possible
with politics. Now we must go back to
the chiefs and enable them to sort out
how we can again find the pathway to
unity (Port Vila Presse Online, 28 May
2004).
Inspired by widespread disillusionment
with the Westminster-style system of
government, such sentiments will only rise
with further political instability. Yet local
strategies such as Nevsem Nenparata are
unlikely to stabilise the national parliament.
Plausibly, developments such as these will
result in the emergence of new forms of
political party. Already, the Grin Pati (Green
Party) acts as an umbrella for such groups.
However, given that these strategies go hand
in hand with calls for greater local
representation in parliament, they contribute
to the erosion of the support base of the major
parties, which are often thought to
subordinate local priorities to national ones.
Given also the great desire for materials and
resources in rural communities, most ni-
Vanuatu have little option but to support
members of parliament whose promises of
largesse often appear more likely to be
delivered than state programs. Moreover,
given the geographic, ethnic and cultural
diversity of Vanuatu, an increasing emphasis
on local networks and local knowledge will
in all likelihood create an equally diverse
parliament with no unifying ideologies, the
implausibility of Vanuatu’s major political
parties disappearing overnight notwith-
standing. An enduring irony of Vanuatu
politics, therefore, is that while public
criticisms of the fragmented national
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parliament, the profligacy of members of
parliament and the apparent inertia of
governments are commonplace, voters have
discarded the major parties in favour of
locally credible independent candidates or
members of smaller parties. It is the increasing
presence of independents and smaller parties
that has intensified political instability.
2004 elections
The 2004 elections resulted in parliamentary
representation being spread evenly between
three medium-sized blocs, one with ten
members (National United Party) and two
with eight members (Vanua’aku Pati and
UMP). Even if they were to join a coalition
government, the combined numbers of the
major parties total only 26, or one-half of the
possible 52 seats in parliament. Independents
and minor parties hold the remaining 26
seats. A (more or less) stable cabinet was
formed in August 2004, incorporating five
independents and 23 members of five parties
(Vanuatu Daily Post, 9 July 2004:2). Included
in the cabinet is breakaway Vanua’aku Pati
member for Tanna, Joe Natuman, who holds
the Ministry of Education portfolio (The
Independent, 7 Aug 2004:2). It is likely that the
Vohor government will be subject to periodical
instability because of its intensely fragmented
nature.
Former Prime Minister Barak Sope was
granted the ministry of foreign affairs,
signalling Vohor’s intention of rolling back
certain parts of the CRP and adjusting the
government’s stance regarding its relations
with Australia. Accepting large soft loans
from the People’s Republic of China, the
Vohor government has become comfortable
in resisting Australian policy imperatives,
the good governance agenda, and core
programs undertaken under the CRP,
including strengthening Vanuatu’s legal
frameworks. Indeed, almost immediately
after taking power, Vohor’s cabinet mounted
attacks on the high number of foreign
advisors in Vanuatu and criticised Australia
as racist for its resistance to Melanesian
labourers working in Australia (Vanuatu
Daily Post, 11 August 2004:2).2 Over the past
few years, gaining access to the Australian
labour market has become popular political
rhetoric. In early September, the government
terminated the appointments of two senior
AusAID consultant lawyers working in the
State Law Office (Attorney General’s
Department) and expelled two Australian
Federal Police liaison officers. It later
rescinded this decision.
Given that Vohor and Sope’s coalition is
at present unwieldy and subject to fracture,
their sabre-rattling must be understood as a
strategy to unify their disparate coalition
against a common adversary (Australia).
Most importantly, it is consistent with the
stance that the UMP, the National United
Party and the Melanesian Progressive Party
have taken regarding reform and foreign
influence since the mid 1990s; it is also
popular among many constituents.
Conclusions and projections
Given the fragmentation of the Vanua’aku
Pati and the further erosion of the major
parties’ electoral support in the snap election
of 2004, it is likely that Vanuatu will undergo
further political instability in the coming
parliamentary term. In an environment of
such instability, the formulation of policy will
be subjected to further strains as the political
manoeuvring in parliament is intensified by
the reliance on numerous parties to form
government; a situation only intensified by
the turn against the major parties.
Historically, the major precipitants of
party fragmentation have been leadership
challenges within the major parties, prompted
by the increasingly highly personalised
nature of Vanuatu politics, in which members
of parliament vie for factional and, ultimately,
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party dominance as a matter of routine. The
thwarted ambitions of politicians seeking
advancement within party structures have
provided the impetus for party splits in the
past, and there appear to be few institutional
or cultural impediments to this situation
continuing.
Electoral results since 1980 imply a shift
from issues of national significance driving
politics (decolonisation, non-alignment) to
issues of more local importance (local
development, responsive local representation,
access to development funds), exemplified by
the increasing support for locally credible,
perhaps parochial, candidates whose major
platforms are local development above all else.
No member of parliament can afford to ignore
local demands in favour of the abstract
principles of national development and good
governance. Unfulfilled promises to
constituencies carry with them the threat of
electoral defeat. Nonetheless, little
consideration is given in regional
communities to the relationship between
national political instability and support for
local independent candidates or those from
minor parties. Arguably, it is the focus on
local concerns that propels political
instability, as the power of the established
political parties is eroded by increasing
numbers of independents and minor parties
in national parliament. The attrition of the
major parties implies also their failure to
satisfy local demands for reciprocity; local
independents and minor local parties are
seen to be less prone to the dictates of
centralised party executives and are
plausibly more responsive to local demands.
There are several paradoxes contained
within Vanuatu’s contemporary political
culture. Larger parties, less receptive to
specific local demands, are nonetheless more
likely to foster a greater degree of political
stability in the national parliament, simply
because they can sidestep the politically
risky issue of maintaining a simple majority
in parliament by allying themselves with a
handful of independents and minor parties,
whose principal motivation is simply to join
the government. Thus, the major parties will
need to mediate their national policies with
the specific demands of independent
members of parliament. Making up one-half
of the parliament, independents will be a
continuing source of political instability. The
increasingly fragmented nature of the
parliament means that developing new
policies is secondary to gaining office. Political
instability has eroded the pre-independence
platforms of the major parties. Political
instability led to the implementation of the
CRP; support for reform and opposition to it
are now the major cleavages that differentiate
the parties.
Notes
1 The rebellion, and to a lesser degree the
polarised political landscape, was more
complex than the Anglophone/Francophone
distinction allows for. The Nagriamel
Movement, a major supporter of the Santo
rebellion, was multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and
multi-denominational in composition, its
eventual co-optation to French and other
agenda notwithstanding.
2 Vohor stated: ‘If ni-Vanuatu were white
skinned like the Samoans or the Cook
Islanders, perhaps the Australians would not
be reluctant in relaxing the immigration laws
to accommodate unskilled labourers to
Australia’ (Vanuatu Daily Post, 11 August
2004:2).
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